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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
WYCOFF CO~IPANY,
INCORPORATED

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
VT.\II, HAL S. BENNETT, DON.\LD 11:\CKING and RAYMOND W.
GEE, ITS COMMISSIONERS,

Case No.

9915

Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
The same designations of the parties will be used herein
as were used in the Brief of Appellants. The defendants,
Public Service Commission of Utah, and its Commissioners,
'"ill he called "Appellants" and Wycoff Company, Incorporated, a Utah corporation, will be called "Respondent."
Respondent essentially agrees with Appellants' introductory statements of the facts. However, some amplifying
comments are deemed appropriate.
Although Respondent's Complaint sought to have decb.red unconstitutional all of the Public Utilities Act (Title
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54, UCA 1953 ), to the extent that the provisions of the lath
act relate to the regulation or control of motor carriers (~
was ordered in the 1953 judgment in Newman vs. Publi
Service Commission, Civil No. 92815, District Court for Sal
Lake County), Respondent withdrew from this positi01
below, and does not appeal from the judgment of the Distric
Court.
The court below heard and denied ( R. 16) Appellants
Motion to Dismiss (R. 15), and Respondent's Motion fo1
Summary Judgment (R. 20-21) was not granted (R. 94)
At the top of Page 4 of Appellants' Brief, paragraph 7 oJ
the complaint is quoted, as follows:
"That the defendants have threatened to requin
plaintiff to pay substantial penalties and have caused
criminal citations to be issued against plaintiff, and
plaintiff's employees, the proceedings under some of
which are still pending, for plaintiff's alleged failure
to comply with the requirements of Title 54, Chapter
6, Utah Code Annotated 1953."
The foregoing allegations are admitted in paragraph 2 of
Appellants' Answer ( R. 17). Reference to Wycoff Company, Incorporated vs. Public Service Commission of Utah,
et al, 13 Ut 2d, 123, 369 Pac 2d 283, involving assessment of
a penalty by said Commission against Respondent in the
amount of $18,500.00 was, as stated by Appellants, assessed
for violations of the Motor Carrier Act detennined to be
unconstitutional by the Court below; and collection proceed·
ings are held in abeyance in the District Court for Salt Lake
County, pending the outcome of the case at bar. (See Appel·
lants' Brief, p. 4)
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EXCLUSIONARY PROVISIONS OF SECTION 54-6-12 UCA 1953, AS AMENDED, DE
NIED TO RESPONDENT CONSTITUTIONAL
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW WHICH
DEPRIVED RESPONDENT OF ITS PROPERTY
\VITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
4

The decision of the trial court that Respondent seeks
to have a.ffinned is based upon the trial court's findings that
Respondent was not being accorded equal protection of the
law in that it belonged to a class that the Motor Carrier
Act discriminates against. This general proposition is described at 12 American Jurisprudence 220, "Constitutional
Law," Section 525.

Generally - The theory underlying constitutional
requirements of equality is that all persons in like
circumstances and like conditions must be treated
alike, both as to privileges conferred and as to liabilities or burdens imposed. Any statute which imposes
special resbictions or burdens on, or grants special
privileges to, certain persons engaged in a business,
which burdens or privileges are not imposed on, or
granted to, other persons engaged in the same business under the same circumstances, is invalid. In
the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, no distinction is to
be observed between the effect of privileges conferred
and the effect of burdens imposed. A privilege conferred upon one class is a discrimination in favor of
that class and against all others not similarly endowed
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just as a burden upon one class is a discriminatio
against it and in favor of all others not similar!
afflicted.
A privilege or a burden is or is not a denial c
the equal protection of the laws according to wheth€
the discrimination relates to a matter upon whic:
classification is legally permissible and, if so, whethe
the classification is a reasonable one.
Respondent relies upon the following constitutional pro
visions:
~ ~ ~ nor shall any state ~ ~ ~ deprive any person o
life, liberty or property without due process of law
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction th1
equal protection of the laws. (Section 1, Fourteentl

Amendment, U.S. Constitution)
All political power is inherent in the people; anc
all free governments are founded on their authori~
for their equal protection and benefit, and they havE
the right to alter or reform their government as thE
public welfare may require (Article I, Section 2, Utah

Constitution)
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law. ( A1ticle I, Sec·

tion 7, Utah Constitution. )
All laws of a general nature shall have unifonn
operation. (Article I, Section 24, Utah Constitution)
The legislature is prohibited from enacting any
private or special laws in the following cases:
16. Granting to an individual, association or cor·
poration any privilege, immunity or franchise.
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5
In all cases where a general law can be applicable, no special law shall be enacted. (Article VI,
Section 26, Utah Constitution)
Sections 54-6-2, -3, -4, and -5 describe the extent to
which carriers are to be regulated by Appellant Commission, declare that all common motor carriers are subject to
such regulation as "common carriers," and prohibit any transportation operations for hire on the public highways of the
State. that are not conducted in accordance with said Act.
Thl'sl' Sections read as follows:
54-6-2. All motor carriers .subfect to regulation as
common carriers. - All common motor carriers of
property or passengers as defined in this act are hereby declared to be common carriers within the meaning of the public utility laws of this state, and subject
to this act and to the laws of this state, including the
regulation of all rates and charges now in force or
that hereafter may be enacted, pertaining to public
utilities and common carriers as far as applicable,
and not in conflict herewith.
5-t-6-3. Transporting for compensation on public high-

ways. - No common or contract motor carrier shall
operate any motor vehicle for the transportation of
either persons or property for compensation on any
public highway in this state except in accordance with
the provisions of this act.
54-6--!. Common motor carriers- Powers and duties

of commission. -

The commission is vested with

P?wer and authority, and it shall be its duty, to superVIse and regulate all common motor carriers and to
fix, alter, regulate and determine just, fair, reasonable
and sufficient rates, fares, charges and classifications;
to regulate the facilities, accounts, service and safety
of operations of each such common motor carrier, to
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regulate operating and time schedules so as to meet
the needs of any community, and so as to insure adequate transportation service to the territory traversed
by such common motor carriers, and so as to prevent
unnecessary duplication of service between these
common motor carriers, and between them and the
line of competing steam and electric railroads; and
the commission may require the coordination of the
service and schedules of competing common carriers
by motor vehicles or electric and steam railroads; to
require the filing of annual and other reports, tariffs,
schedules and other data by such common motor
carriers and the public and between such common
motor carriers and other common carriers, to the end
that the provisions of this chapter may be fully and
complete!J carried out. The commission shall have
power and authority, by general order or otherwise,
to prescribe rules and regulations in conformity with
this act applicable to any and all such common motor
carriers, and to do all things necessary to carry out
and enforce the provisions of this act. All laws relat·
ing to the powers, duties, authority and jurisdiction
of the commission over common carriers are hereby
made applicable to all such common motor carriers
except as herein otherwise specifically provided. (Em·
phasis added. )

54-6-5. Intrastate commerce- Certificate of convenience and necessity. - It shall be unlawful for any
common motor carrier to operate as a carrier in in~a
state commerce within this state without first havmg
obtained from the commission a certificate of con·
venience and necessity.' ' '
Section 54-6-18, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, stipulates
that every carrier or person who violates any provision of
the Motor Carrier Act is guilty of a misdemeanor; and Sec·
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54-7-25, et seq, provide other penalties for failure to
>mply with any part of Title 54, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
y excluding certain motor carriers from general regulation
f the Public Service Commission, Section 54-6-12 establishes
rivileged classes which are not subject to the following type
f general regulation by the Commission:

[)1l

1. They do not have to obtain Certificates of Convenince and Necessity (Section 54-6-5) or Contract Carrier
1
ermits (Section 54-6-9).

2. They are not regulated as to rates and classifications
Section 54-6-11 ) .
3. They are not subject to regulation in transferring
:ertificates or permits in the event of transfer or death of the
•wner (Section 54-6-24).
4. They do not have to obtain temporary or emergency
~nnits when the need arises (Section 54-6-10).
5. They are not regulated pertaining to their accounts
md records, including methods of depreciation (Section 54l-23, -24).
6. They are not regulated concerning keeping records
md books available within the state and subject to inspection (Section 54-7-8 ) .
7. They do not have to keep and maintain a schedule
of rates and charges as condition precedent to doing business
(Section 54-3-6 and 54-7-12).
8. H they are a corporation, they are not regulated as to
declaration and payment of dividends (Section 54-4-27).
9. They are not forbidden to discriminate in services
rendered or rates charged (Section 54-3-8).
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The foregoing list does not purport to be an exhaustive
one by any means, but is simply set forth to illustrate what
is involved in being subject to general regulation and not
being so subjected.
It may be of assistance to point out that Section 54-2-1
( 28) defines the term "public utility" to include every "common carrier." Section 54-6-2 provides that all motor carriers
"as defined in this act are hereby declared to be common
carriers within the meaning of the public utility laws." Section 54-6-12 provides that "no portion of this act shall apply"
to those carriers excluded from general regulation of the
Public Service Commission, "except for the provisions of
54-6-17 relative to the requirements of insurance, 54-6-21
relative to safety regulations, and 54-6-22 relative to accident reports." It should be borne in mind that, although the
next to last paragraph of 54-6-12 gives the Commission
power to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations to carry
out the purposes of the act, any such rules and regulations

are limited only to matters of insurance, safety regulations
and accident reports, as provided. The power to regulate exempt carriers is limited to the stated exceptions, namely, general regulation of insurance, safety regulations and accident
reports.
The District Court found, and Respondent contends,
that this causes the entire motor carrier act contained in
Chapter 6, Title 54, Utah Code Annotated 1953, to be un·
constitutional. The correct rule is stated in 11 American
Jurisprudence 855, "Constitutional Law" Section 161, dealing
with striking out unconstitutional exceptions:
One important class of cases in which qu~stions
as to the severability of valid and invalid port1~ns of
an act and the determination of the legislative mtent
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are involved consists of statutes containing invalid exceptions or provisos. The general rule is that if. such a
proviso operates to limit the scope of the act m su.ch
a mannt'r that by striking out the proviso, the remamder of the statute would have a broader scope either
as to subject or territory, then the whole act is invalid,
bt'cause such extended operation would not be in
accordance with the legislative intent.
:n other words, if the court were to strike out the exceptions
~tained in 54-6-12, the remainder of the Motor Carrier Act
would be broader, the result would not be as intended by
:he legislature, which has a predominance of rural legislators,
md the whole act would be invalid.
The quotation from 11 Am. Jur. 855 continues at
page 866:
Instances of the application of this rule may be
found in the case of statutes prohibiting trusts or
combinations to fix prices or restrict the production of
articles of commerce, but excepting from the prohibitions all persons engaged in agriculture or horticulture; 0 o 0 , and the courts may properly infer that it
would not have been enacted if such group had not
been excluded from its operation and protected from
its provisions.
The recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court
which have held that failure of state legislatures to reapportion themselves to be no longer without a federal judicial
remedy, points up one of the political facts of life of the
twentieth century: State Legislatures are controlled by
rural areas although the rural population comprises a minority. It would be possible to infer that the exclusionary
provisions of the 1935 Motor Carrier Act were inserted
to satisfy the farm lobby and other politically-favored
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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groups who were more effective than others in escaping
regulation. As the Court is aware, the Third District Court
'
for Salt Lake County, by and through Judge Joseph G.
Jeppson, declared not only the Motor Carrier Act but all
of the Public Utilities Act unconstitutional, to the extent that
the provisions of the latter act related to the regulation or
control of motor carriers ( R. 7-11). Although this case was
appealed to the Supreme Court, it was dismissed on June 3,
1953, upon the motion of the Public Service Commission
( R.l7, paragraph 2). Respondent does not now contend the
Public Utilities Act (Title 54) to be unconstitutional because
the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 was merely amendatory of the
1917 Public Utility Act. Smith vs. Cahoon, 283 US 553, 75
L. 2d. 1264 was the principal authority relied upon in the
Newman case, and it involved a Florida motor carrier regu·
latory act with exclusions held to be constitutionally defec·
tive under the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The exclusions from the
Florida statute was quoted in the opinion (p. 1269), as
follows:
Provided, That the term 'auto transportation
company' as used in this act shall not include corpora·
tions or persons engaged exclusively in the transporta·
tion of children to or from school, or any transporta·
tion company engaged exclusively in the transporting
of agricultural, horticultural, dairy, or other farm
products with fresh and salt fish and oysters ~nd
shrimp from the point of production to the assembling
or shipping point en route to primary ma~ket or to
motor vehicles used exclusively in transporting or de·
livering dairy products or any transportation company
engaged in operating taxicabs, or hotel busses from .a
depot to a hotel in the same town or city. (EmphasiS
supplied)
0

0

0
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Regarding the exclusionary provisions, the Court declared at page 1274 of 75 L.ed.
• • • The act provides that the term auto transportation company, upon which the obligations of the act
are imposed, shall not include 'any transportation
company engaged exclusively in the transporting
agricultural, horticultural, dairy or other farm products and fresh and salt fish and oysters and shrimp
from the point of production to the assembling or
shipping point en route to primary market or to motor
vehicles used exclusively in transporting or delivering
dairy products.' The point with respect to this discrimination is not that a distinction is made between
common carriers and private carriers, but between
private carriers themselves, although they are alike
engaged in transporting property for compensation
over public highways between fixed termini or over
a regular route.
The holding of the Court (page 1274) is plain and unequivocal:
• • o (T)here does not appear to be the slightest
justification for making a distinction between those
who carry for hire farm products, or milk or butter, or
fish or oysters, and those who carry for hire bread or
sugar, or tea or coffee, or groceries in general, or other
useful commodities. So far as the statute was designed to safeguard the public with respect to the
use of the highways, we think that the discrimination
it makes between the private carriers which are relieved of the necessity of obtaining certificates and
giving security, and a carrier such as the appellant,
was wholly arbitrary and constituted a violation of
the appellant's constitutional right. Such a classification is not based on anything having relation to the
purpose for which it is made.' (Cases cited. )
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The entire Florida act was declared void and unconstitutional and the Utah Motor Carrier Act can have no better
standing.
Appellants would have this Court believe that the controlling factor which influenced the court in Smith v. Cahoon
to declare the Florida motor carrier act unconstitutional was
that regulated carriers were required to provide a bond or
insurance and that excepted carriers were not. The opinion
makes clear that there are other constitutional defects when,
at page 1274 of 75 L Ed it is stated:

If we leave on one side the requirement that a certificate holder, who is a private carrier, shall give a bond
or policy for the goods carried by him, irrespective
of his contract with his employer whose goods he
carries, and if we consider any of the provision for the
protection of the public with respect to the use of the
highways, another constitutional difficulty is encountered, that is, of an unconstitutional discrimination.
(Emphasis supplied)
The court held that the Florida act was invalid on its face,
on page 1272 of 75 LEd:
The statute on its face makes no distinction between
common carriers and a private carrier such as the ap·
pellant. It applies, without any stated exception, to
every auto transportation company within the statu·
tory definition, and this admittedly included the ~p
pellant. It not only required an application force~
cate of public convenience and necessity but that this
should be accompanied by a schedule of tariffs,. ~nd
no such certificate was to be valid without the giVmg
of a bond by the applicant
(t

(t

(t.

On the face of the statute, the scheme was obviously
one for the supervision and control of those carriers
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which, by reason of the nature of their undertaking
or business, were subject to regulation by public
authority in relation to rates and service.
It is submitted that the unlawful discrimination the court

found through the failure to protect the public by requiring
regulated and unregulated carriers to give a bond ar public
liability insurance was only "another" fatal defect.
The writer of this brief is well aware that the present
members of this Court were the authors of the decision in
Justice vs. Standard Gilsonite, 12 Utah 2d 357, 366 P.2d
97.t. This case recently declared unconstitutional the penalty
provisions of the Utah statute governing payment of wages.
Section 34-10-6, UCA 1953 provides as follows:
Section 34-10-2. "None of the provisions of this
chapter shall apply to the state, or to any county, incorporated city or town, or other political subdivision,
or to employers and employees engaged in farm,
dairy, agricultural, viticultural or horticultural pursuits, or to banks and mercantile houses, or to stock or
poultry raising, or to household domestic service, or to
any other employment, where an agreement exists
between employer and employee providing for different terms of payment."
The opinion specifies:
The question presented is whether the exclusion of
"Banks and mercantile houses" makes the act arbitrary, discriminatory class legislation.
The Justice case overruled State v. Walker;) 100 Utah 523,
116 P 2d 766 as a precedent, as follows:
In State r. Walker:J a criminal conviction of an employer for refusal to pay wages due when demanded
under Chapter 60, Laws of Utah for 1937, where the
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statutes involved were similar to those involved in
this action, we held that there is a reasonable basis
to differentiate banks and mercantile houses from the
included employers so that the provisions were not
unconstitutional. We have carefully reconsidered this
problem and notwithstanding our previous holding in
the Walker case, we conclude that there is no reasonable basis for exclusion of banks and mercantile
houses from the penalty provisions of this act as distinguished from other employers which are included,
and that such provisions are thus reneder unconstitutional.
Other courts have reached similar holdings.

Priest v. State Tax Commission, Ky., 80 S.W.2d 43,
involved an interpretation of the Kentucky act regulating
transportation for hire by motor vehicles. The act exempted:
Motor vehicles transporting farm products, including
dairy products and livestock from the farm to point
of destination, or from any point to the farm, by way
of the shortest practicable route.
The court held:
The Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
Smith v. Cahoon, 2$3 U.S. 553, 51 S. Ct. 582, 75 L.
Ed. 1264, determined and disposed of what we conclude is almost exactly the same question by holding
that the same attempted classification for exemption
purposes in the same character of statute offended
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution and was invalid. The enactment
there involved was a statute of the state of Florida,
and which, as we have said, related to the same subject as do the two domestic statutes above referred to;
i.e., the regulation of motor transportation vehicles on
public highways for hire. Among the exempting proSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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0

0

0

visions in the Florida statute was one
saying:
(Court quotes). It was attacked by others engaged
in similar transportation of other freight and products
not ('mbraced therein upon the same ground as is
urged by plaintiffs herein. The case found its way to
the Supreme Court of the United States, and in its
opinion it sustained the ground of attack because it
found that the classification that the Florida Legislature attempted to make was unreasonable, arbitrary,
and without factual distinction, and was not based on
anything having relation to the purpose for which it
was made.
Other questions are discussed and disposed of in the
opinion, but on the one now under consideration the
opinion said, inter alia: "But, in establishing such a
regulation, there does not appear to be the slightest
justification for making a distinction between those
who carry for hire farm products, or milk or butter, or
fish or oysters, 0 0 0 or tea or coffee, or groceries
in general, or other useful commodities." The holding
of the opinion was followed by the United States
District Court of the Eastern District of South Carolina in Sutt v. Ellerbe, 56 F. 2d 1058, and by the
United States District Court, District of Kansas, in the
case of Louis v. Boynton 53 F. 2d 471, wherein the
same character of exemption was involved in the statute there under consideration. The holding by the
federal courts in those opinions has not been departed
from, although learned counsel for defendants insist
that they have lately manifested an inclination to do
so. The cases cited in support of that suggestion do
not involve the questions now under consideration,
but dealt only with the right of a state to enact police
regulations with reference to motor vehicles engaged
in interstate commerce, and are therefore not applicable here.
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The court concluded, by distinguishing cases later to Smith
v. Cahoon, as follows:
The same counsel also rely upon the cases of Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352,52 S. Ct.
595, 596,76 L. Ed. 1155, 81 ALR 1402, and Hicklin v.
Covey, 290 U.S. 169, 54 S. Ct. 142, 144, 78 L.Ed. 247.
In the Woodring Case the exemption was: "The transportation of livestock and farm products to market 'by
the owners thereof or supplies for his own use in his
own motor vehicle.'" The Supreme Court referred to
its prior opinion in the Cahoon Case, supra, and, in
distinguishing the exemption there involved from the
one then being considered, the opinion said: "The
distinction in the instant case is of a different sort.
The statute does not attempt to impose an arbitrary
discrimination between carriers who transport property for hire, or compensation, with respect to the
class of products they carry. The exemption runs
only to one who is carrying his own livestock and
farm products to market or supplies for his own use in
his own motor vehicle." The exemption of the Kansas
statute then under consideration was upheld.
In the Hicklin Case the exemption in the statute was:
"Farmers or dairymen, hauling dairy or farm products;
or lumber haulers engaged in transporting lumber and
logs from the forest to the shipping points." The
Supreme Court, in upholding it, adverted to the fact
that the particular excepted transportation was known
to be seasonable, in that it was not constant the year
round. But it furthermore said that: "The exemption
here is further limited by the fact that it can apply
only to one whose principal business is that of a
farmer or dairyman and not to one merely incidentally
engaged in farming or dairying." That language was
taken with approval from the opinion of the Supreme
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Court of South Carolina. In neither the Woodring
nor the Hicklin opinions of the Supreme Court was
there anv modification of its opinion in the prior
Cahoon Case, supra. On the contrary, in each of
them is was expresly referred to, and the distinction
between the statute there involved and the ones
involved in the Woodring and Hicklin Cases was
pointed out.
These same distinctions apply to these cases now which
are cited in Appellant's brief.
As hereinbefore seen, exemption 3 of the 1934 act,
which is the subject matter of attack by plaintiffs, is
not limited or extended to the farmer, or the dairyman, or the producer of any of the articles therein
mentioned in hauling his products to market by employing his own truck, as was true in the Woodring
and Hicklin Cases; but, on the contrary, the exemption runs alone to not merely agricultural and dairy
products, but to such products when, and only when,
being transported from the farm to the point of destination by one who is regularly engaged in the motor
transportation business for compensation, as are the
plaintiffs in this action. We can see no escape from
the conclusion announced by the Supreme Court in
the Cahoon Case or any way by which it may be
avoided. Indeed, the Legislature itseH was necessaritly doubtful of the proposition, since it expressly
enacted in the 1934 act that, if the exemption 3
therein adopted should be declared to be unconstitutional, "then it is the intention of the legislature that
the present section ° 0 0 shall remain and be in force,"
and which is exemption "Three" in the 1932 act.
Since we conclude that there can be no reasonable
distinction drawn between the statue here involved
and the one before the Supreme Court in the Cahoon
Case, it follows that the court erred in upholding the
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validity of exemption No.3 contained in the 1934 act,
and which, according to the express provisions of
that amendment, automatically reinstates exemption
"Three" of the 1932 act.
Franchise Motor Freight Assn. v. Seavey, ........ Cal.
------------, 235 P 1000 (Cal. Sup. Ct. in Bank) was a mandamus action to compel the State Commission to assume jurisdiction over agricultural truckers for hire who had been excluded from Commission regulation by an amendment to
the existing act which plaintiffs contended was unconstitutional. The Commission had refused to exercise jurisdiction
because said amendment excluded "the movement of products or implements of husbandry and other farm necessities
from farm to farm or from and to farms to and from loading
point, warehouse or other initial points."
At page 1002 the opinion states:
The question, therefore, is whether or not the
exemption created by the proviso of 1923 constitutes
a lawful classification. 0 0 0 It is equally well settled
that a statute makes on improper and unlawful discrimination if it confers particular privileges upon a
class arbitrarily selected from a larger number of
persons, all of whom stand in the same relation to the
privileges granted, and between whom and the persons not so favored no reasonable distinction or substantial difference can be found justifying the inclusion of the one and the exclusion of the other. 5 Cal
Jur. 825, and cases cited.
What reasonable ground of distinction is there
between a common carrier engaged in the business of
hauling various kinds of freight, including products
and implements of husbandry, by motor truck over a
regular route upon the public highway, and anot?er
common carrier engaged in the business of hauling
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freight, which consists solely of the products and implements of husbandry, by motor truck over the same
route, which justifies the subjection of the one to the
regulations imposed by the Auto Stage and Truck
Transportation Act, and the exemption of the other
from the burden of those regulations? (Emphasis
added)

The court concluded:
0

0

0

we are impelled to conclude that no natural,
intrinsic, or constitutional distinction is to be found
as a basis for the exemption of the transportation
companies described in the 1923 amendment, supra,
from the regulations described in the 0 0 0 Act, and
that such attempted exemption is violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution
and of like provisions in our State Constitution.

The Seavey Case was cited recently with approval by the
California Supreme Court (en Bane) in Katze vs. County
of Los Angeles, ............-Calif............. 341 P. 2d 310, at 316,
as follows:
\\'here the legislative classification is unreasonable,
the courts will invalidate the law. In Franchise Motor
Freight Association vs. Seavey ............ Calif.............,
235 P 1000 (Cal S. Ct. in Bank) we said that "a
statute makes an improper and unlawful discrimination if it confers particular privileges upon a class
arbitrarily selected from a larger number of persons,"
etc. (as quoted above. )
.\s the Florida Act was held invalid in Smith v. Cahoon,
it is submitted that the Utah Motor Carrier Act is unconstitutional on its face; and, in the language of the Seavey Case,
what reasonable ground of distinction is there between the
transportation of sand and gravel, ore, water and minerals
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(subject to general regulation), and coal, lumber or logs
(not so regulated); cancelled checks (regulated) and money
and other valuables (not regulated)? Appellants contend
that the legislature had good reasons for making these exemptions and cites a number of cases where other jurisdictions have upheld the various exceptions described in subsections (a) through (g) of Section 54-6-12.
Nearly all of the cases cited by appellants involve the
construction of taxing statutes imposed for revenue purposes.
The revenue cases must be distinguished from those involving regulatory legislation. Chapter 6 of Title 54, UCA 1953
is strictly a regulatory measure. Justice Cardozo in Aero
Mayflower Transit Company vs. Georgia Public Service
Commission, 295 U.S. 285, 79 L.ed. 1439, made this distinction apparent at 79 LEd 1444 when he declared, after referring to the plight of Georgia farmers, as indicated in the
earlier decision of Georgia Supreme Court:
~ ~ l:t The effect of the exception would be to equalize
the burden. "Every one knows that as a general rule
a tax of this kind finally reaches the consumer of the
product, or user of the service; and hence an exemp·
tion of carriers of such products is to be taken as an
exemption of the products themselves, and not of the
carrier." The enumeration of rational bases of distinction was not put forward as exhaustive. The
court expressed the belief that others could be added.

We think a classification thus designed to ameliorate the lot of the producers of farm and dairy pr~
ucts is not an arbitrary preference within the meamng
and the condemnation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The plight of the Georgia farmer has been pictured ?Y
the state court in words already quoted. To free htm
of fresh burdens might seem to a wise statecraft to be
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a means whereby to foster agriculture and promote
thl' common good. The case is a very different one
from Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 75 L Ed 1264,
51 S Ct 582. There a Florida statute, similar to this
one in many of its provisions, gave relief from its
exactions to any transportation company engaged exclusively in the carriage of agricultural, horitcultural,
dairy or farm products, whether for the producer or
for any one else. The attack was not directed, as in
the case at hand, to an exemption of a particular class
of carriers upon rational grounds of policy from the
payment of an annual tax. (Emphasis furnished. )
After discussing the cases (also quoted by Appellants
from this Aero Mayflower Case), the Court's opinion continues at page 1445 of 79 L. Ed., as follows:
These cases and others like them (American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89, 45 LEd 102,
21 S Ct 43) are illustrations of the familiar doctrine
that a legislature has a wide discretion in the classification of trades and occupations for the purpose of
taxation and in the allowance of exemptions and deductions within reasonable limits. (Emphasis is mine)

and nails down the distinction when a tax statute is involved
in this area of constitutional law at the end of this same page,
by declaring:
Be that as it may, exemption from a tax stands
upon a different footing, though the purpose of the
tax is the upkeep of the highway. At such times the
legislature may go far in apportioning and classifying
to the end that public burdens may be distributed in
accordance with its own conception of policy and justice. H its action be not arbitrary, the courts will
stand aloof.
·
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Continental Baking Company v. Woodring, 286 U.S.
352, 76 L.ed 1155; not only is a tax revenue case, but the
agricultural exemption is distinguished by the court itself at
76 L. ed. 1167 when it points out that "the exemption runs
only to one who is carrying his own livestock and fann products to market or supplies for his own use in his own motor
vehicle."
It is obvious that any decision of a lower Federal
Court, such as Schwartzman Service, Inc. vs. Stahl, 60 Fed.
2d 1034, is not to be given undue weight by counsel attempting to distinguish a U.S. Supreme Court decision.

Anderson v. Thomas, Commissioner of Public Utilities,
26 P 2d 60, Kelly v. Finney 207 Ind. 557, 194 N.E. 157; Ex
Parte Iratacable, 55 Nev. 263, 30 P. 2d 284; Hicklin v. Covey,
290 U.S. 169, 78 L Ed 247 are all to be distinguished tax
revenue cases and as otherwise distinguished hereinbefore.

The cases cited by Appellants involving constitutionality of various Sunday closing laws of the various states, surely
have no application in these proceedings. Entirely different
policy considerations are apparent when a State establishes a
social policy having religious overtones, and when, as here,
it regulates, or excepts from regulation a business enterprise
serving the public as a common carrier.
Appellants infers that, the staute under question is valid,
too, because federal law pertaining to motor carriers contains
some exemptions or exclusions similar to those contained in
the Utah Motor Carrier Act. Obviously there is a distinction
between Federal and State legislation. The "due process"
clause of the Fifth Amendment (Federal action), unlike
the Fourteenth Amendment (State action), contains no
equal protection clause. In Sunshine Anthracite Coal Com·
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ptmy vs. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 84 L.ed. 1263, the court
summarily rejected a ''claim of discrimination" with the
remark that, "the Fifth Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth,
has no equal protection clause," citing Steward Machine
Company v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 81 LEd 1279.
The virility of Smith v. Cahoon is demonstrated by

.\Iorey r. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 1 L.ed. 2d 1485, which involved a construction of the Community Currency Exchangt's Act. The act required a state license from those issuing money orders in Illinois, and otherwise regulated their
operations. The American Express Company was excepted
from the provisions of the act and, for that reason the act's
constitutionality was duly challenged. At 1 L.ed. 2d 1491
the court referred to Smith vs. Cahoon and stated:
0

0

0

the act (in Smith v. Cahoon) excepted motor
vehicles carrying specified products. This court held
that the exception violated the Equal Protection
Clause since the statutory purpose of protecting the
public did not reasonably support a discrimination between the carrying of exempt products like farm produce and of regulated products like groceries. "Such
a classification is not based on anything having relation to the purpose for which it is made." Ibid 283

u.s.
0

0

567.
0

The principles controlling in the Smith and Hartford
Co. cases, both supra, are applicable here.
. Appellants reference to Railway Express Agency v. New
l ork, 336 U.S. 106, 93 L.ed. 533, to indicate a restricted scope
of Smith t:. Cahoon, fails to take cognizance of its strength
when the opinion declares:
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In (Smith v. Cahoon) o o o a motor vehicle regulation was struck down upon citation of many authorities because 'such a classification is not based on
anything having relation to the purpose for which it is
made.' If that were the situation here, I should think
we should reach a similar conclusion.
The question before the court was the constitutionality of a
city ordinance prohibiting advertising upon the business
vehicles involved. This involved freedom of speech and is
a far different situation than presented by the case at bar.
The exceptions of Section 54-6-12 are unreasonably discriminatory and, in your language in Justice v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 12 Utah 2d 357, 366 P.2d 974, involve an "exclusion" which is "arbitrary and has no reasonable justification
in fact.'' For convenience, portions of the opinion in the
Justice case are set forth:
We have carefully reconsidered this problem and
notwithstanding our previous holding in the Walker
case, we conclude that there is no reasonable basis
for exclusion of banks and mercantile houses from the
penalty provisions of this act as distinguished from
other employers which are included, and that such
provisions are thus rendered unconstitutional
o o o So we conclude that this classification excluding banks and mercantile houses from the penalty provisions of this chapter is arbitrary and has no reason·
able justification in fact.

Respondent is unable to comprehend any proper justifi·
cation reasonably related to the purposes of the Motor Car·
rier Act why trucks hauling oil, for instance, from the wellhead to the refinery, or ores from the mine to the mill or
market, should be subject to general regulation of the Appel·
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lant Commission, while on the other hand, trucks hauling
coal, lumber or logs to shipping point or market are exempt.
Ot hl'r illustrations are readily apparent by reading Section
54-6-12 and in comparing the exhibits attached to the Stipulation on file herein, between the parties ( R.22-44). For
instance, what is the basis for regulating "commercial papers"
and "negotiable securities" used in a bank, ( R.38, 43), but
l'Xl'mpting "money and valuables" in an armored car? (Section 54-6-12 (b) This is certainly class legislation. The
exceptions from general regulation of the motor carrier act
result in improper class legislation. Said classifications do not
lwar a reasonable relationship to the objectives sought to be
accomplished by this statute, as set forth in Chapter 6, Title

54.
Section 54-6-1 contains a catch-all definition to the effect
that every motor carirer, for hire, is either a common or contract carrier, subject to general regulation. Section 54-6-2
purports to declare that all motor carriers, for hire, are
subject to regulation of all rates and charges. A showing of
public convenience and necessity, based upon a hearing and
proper findings and conclusions of the Commission, is required by Sections 54-6-5 and -8. Nevertheless, Section
54-6-12 removes the necessity for certain favored carriers to
comply with these requirements, whereas Respondent must
comply or be subject to penalties and criminal citations.
The conclusions of the trial court are amply substantiated and the Motor Carrier Act is unconstitutional not only
tmder the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States of America and Article 1 Section 7, but also under
similar provisions of the Utah Constitution.
For instance, as stated in People vs. Western Fruit
Growers, ............ Calif............. , 140 P.2d 13, 19:
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In the leading case in this state on the question
of the distinction between a general and special law,
the court declared that a law is a general one when
it applies equally to all persons embraced in a class
founded upon some natural, intrinsic, or constitutional
distinction; on the other hand, it is special legislation
if it confers particular privileges, or imposes peculiar
disabilities or burdensome conditions, in the exercise
of a common right, upon a class of persons arbitrarily
selected from the general body of those who stand in
precisely the same relation to the subject of the law.
City of Pasadena v. Stimson, 91 Cal 238, 251, 252,
27 P. 604; and see Ray v. Parker, supra; Jersey Maid
Milk Products Co., Inc. v. Brock, supra; Frank v.
Maguire, 201 Cal. 414, 257 P. 515; Martin v. Superior
Court, 194 Cal. 93, 227 P. 762; Reclamation Dist.
No. 1500 v. Riley, 192 Cal. 147, 218 P. 762; In re
Sumida, 177 Cal. 388, 170 P. 823; Ex parte Stoltenberg, 165 Cal. 789, 134 P. 971; Matter of Miller, 162
Cal. 687, 124 P. 427. Under this rule, it is apparent
that the constitutional prohibition of special legislation does not preclude legislative classification but
only requires that the classification be reasonable. In
re Willing, 12 Cal. 2d 591, 86 P. 2d 663; Barker Bros.,
Inc., v. City of Los Angeles, 10 Cal. 2d 603, 76 P. 2d
97; In re Weisberg, 215 Cal. 624, 12 P. 2d 446; Seaboard Acceptance Corp. v. Shay, 214 Cal. 361, 5 P. 2d
882; Watson v. Division of Mat or Vehicles, 212 Cal.
279, 298 P. 481; Bacon Service Corp. v. Huss, 199 Cal.
21, 248 P. 235.

Problems of classification under the California
constitution are thus similar to those presented by the
federal equal protection of the laws clause of the 14th
Amendment. (Emphasis added)
The Utah Constitution also is similar.
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POINT II
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ESTOPPED TO CHALLENGE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
MOTOR CARRIER ACT.

Section 78-33-2 UCA 1953, clearly authorizes a declaratory judgment proceeding to determine the constitutionality
of a statute, as follows:
Any person ° 0 0 whose rights, status or other legal
relations are affected by a statute, 0 0 0 may have
determined any question of construction or validity
arising under the 0 0 0 statute 0 0 0 •
In PHI KAPPA IOTA Fraternity vs. Salt Lake City, 116
Ut. 536, 212 Pac. 2d 177, and Gray vs. Defa, 103 Utah 339,
135 Pac. 2d 251, it has been held that declaratory relief is
available to question the constitutionality of ordinances and
statutes. Appellants completely ignore the effect of the Utah
Declaratory Judgment Act and all of the cases cited in Appelants' Brief are to be distinguished. Cases under the Federal declaratory judgment act are not apposite because of
the "case or controversy" requirements of the U.S. Constitution and due to the fact that the Federal act does not contain the following:
78-33-12 Chapter to be liberally construed. This
chapter is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to
settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations; and is to be liberally construed and administered.
The annotation at 174 ALR 549, "Interest Necessary to
~laintenance of Declaratory Determination of Validity of

Statute or Ordinance," states the general rule here applicable:
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Persons engaged in occupations or professions subject
to r~gulation by statute or. ordinance are generally
considered to have a sufficient interest to maintain
a declaratory judgment action testing the validity of
the statute or ordinance. (Page 560; see also page
558.)
The cases cited by Appellants correctly state a rule which
is not applicable here. There are well known exceptions to
the rule relied upon by Appellants, although some courts
have apparently differed, as recognized in 11 American Jurisprudence 771, "Constitutional Law, Section 124":
~ ~ ~ The mere fact that one wishing to operate
motor vehicles for hire on an interstate highway applies to the state officials for a certificate, as required
by a state statute, does not prevent his assailing the
statute as unconstitutional in case the certificate is
denied. Similarly, securing a license under a statute
does not estop one from questioning the validity of the
statute, although as to this point some courts have
reached a contrary conclusion. ~ ~ ~

Courts are properly restrictively circumspect to require
an adequate justicible interest in a party who challenges the
constitutionality of a statute. As stated in 13 American Jurisprudence 393, "Licenses," Section 85:
Who May Question Validity or Administration of
License Law - In accordance with the general rule
that only those adversely affected by legisla~on can
question its validity, the court will not consider an
objection to the validity of a license law when made
by one whose rights are not injuriously affected ther~
by, and one may not complain that a license .law IS
invalid as against a class other than to which he
belongs. ~ -o -o
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When a statute, valid upon its face, requires the issue
of a license or a certificate as a condition precedent
to carrying on a business or following a vocation, one
who is within the terms of the statute, but has failed
to make the required application, is not at liberty to
complain of the invalidity of the statute. (Emphasis
added.)
In other words, only a person with sufficient interest has
standing to raise a constitutional question. This rule is stated
with plainness at 11 American Jurisprudence 755, "Constitutional Law," Section 111:
The general rule that in order to attack the constitutionality of a statute a person must show sufficient
interest in himself applies with full force to attempted
attacks upon the constitutionality of acts of the departments of government. It is an established principle that for a private individual to be entitled to
invoke the judicial power to determine the validity
of executive or legislative action, he must show that
he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of that action; it is
not sufficient that he has merely a general interest
common to all members of the public.
This rule is amplified and clarified at 11 American Jurisprudence 748:
One of the elementary doctrines of constitutional
law, finnly established by the authorities, is that ·the
constitutionality of a legislative act is open to attack
only by a person whose rights are affected thereby.
Before a law can be assailed by any person on the
ground that it is unconstitutional, he must show that
he has an interest in the question in that the enforcement of the law would be an infringement on his
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ity of the statute and that they are thereby injuriously
affected.
and in 11 American Jurisprudence 759:
A person who is seeking to raise the question as to
the validity of a discriminatory statute has no standing for that purpose unless he belongs to the class
which is prejudiced by the statute.
It is submitted that to test the constitutionality of the
Motor Carrier Act it would be extremely difficult, if not
impossible to do so, unless one were a licensed motor carrier.
This is indicated in 33 American Jurisprudence 393, "Licenses," Section 85:

When a statute, valid upon its face, requires the issue
of a license or certificate as a condition precedent to
carrying on a business or following a vocation, one
who is within the terms of the statute, but has failed
to make the required application, is not at liberty to
complain of the invalidity of the statute or because of
his anticipation of improper or invalid action in administration. # # # When, however, the statute is invalid upon its face and an attempt is made to enforce
its penalties against such person in violation of his
constitutional rights, the question of validity is necessarily presented.
An excellent annotation entitled "Right to Attack Validity of Statute, Ordinance or Regulation Relating to Occu·
pational or Professional License as Affected by Applying for,
or Securing License" appears at 65 A.L.R. 2d 660.
The quotation from 65 ALR 2d 664 in Appellants' Brief,
beginning on page 6, omits the following portions of the
material quotated in Respondent's Memorandum for the
trial court ( R. 63) :
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Excepting situations in which the attack is made
in proceedings in which it is sought to obtain the
license, it seems that a person is not, merely by applying for a license, precluded from attacking the validity of the licensing law. The mere fact that a license
had been issued to a party without an application on
his part for a license and that the party had complied
with the conditions of the license has been held not
to estop him from afterward attacking the validity of
such condition.
While in some cases an attack on the validity of
a licensing law as a whole has been held premissible,
even though it was made by one who had obtained a
license under the law, there are other cases indicating
that such an attack may not be directed at the licensing law as a whole, but may be directed at specific
provisions thereof. On the other hand, it cannot be
said that an attack on specific provisions of the licensing law is always permissible; in particular, it has
been uniformly held that a licensee may not attack
the validity of provisions for fees or taxes contained
in the licensing law. The courts are not in agreement
as to whether a person is, by obtaining a professional
or occupational license, precluded from attacking the
validity of an administrative regulation issued under
the licensing law. It has been uniformly held that the
obtaining of a license does not prevent the licensee
from challenging the validity of a provision of the
licensing law enacted after his application for a license under an earlier statute has been granted.
It is of interest that a distinction is drawn when payment of a tax or license fee is involved as an issue. Appellants' inadvertently cut off the last portion of the quotation from 65 ALR 2d, and the period after the word ''litiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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gant" should be a comma so that the last sentence reads as
follows:
Some of the courts, in holding whether an attack was
not permissible, have emphasized that the application
for the license was the voluntary act of the litigant,
while other courts, in reaching the opposite result as
to the permissibility o1 the attack, have emphasized
that in view of the penalties prescribed in the licensing law for acting without license, the application for
the license was not the voluntary act of the litigant.
(Emphasis supplied. )
At page 668 of 65 ALR 2d some of the cases are set
forth in which an attack on the validity of the licensing law
as a whole has been held proper against allegations of estoppel, even though made by one who had obtained a license
under the law.
One of these is Southern Motorways, Inc. v. Perry, 39
Fed. 2d 145. This was a suit in equity challenging the constitutionality of the Georgia Motor Carrier Act and to enjoin
its enforcement. This case apparently preceded enactment of
the declaratory judgment acts, but it recognized some of the
problems that exist through application of the estoppel doctrine here asserted by Appellants, when it concluded at
page 148:
It would be unfortunate practically to have some of

these carriers regulated through estoppel and others
unregulated because of a successful attack upon the
regulations.
Schwegmann Bros. vs. Louisiana Board of A.B.C., 216
La. 148, 43 So. 2d 248, 14 ALR 2d 680, puts this entire matter
into proper perspective when, at pages 687 and 688 of 14
ALR 2d, the Court stated:
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o o • appellants contend that as a licensee plaintiff
has no right (it is estopped) to attack the starnte
undn which it holds a permit.

This contention, in which we find no merit, has
as its basis the doctrine of waiver or estoppel to
assert the invalidity of a law. But essential to that
doctrine is the element of voluntary action which is
completely lacking here, resulting in the case falling
within one of the frequently occurring exceptions.
In 11 American Jurisprudence verbo Constitutional
Law, Section 124, it is said: "The most important and
frequent class of exceptions to the general doctrine of
waiV('r or estoppel to assert the invalidity of a law is
that where a statute requires a duty which is mandatory in fmm, accompanied by penalties for failure to
obey its provisions, or is otherwise coercive. In such
cases the element of voluntary action essential to
waiver or estoppel is absent o 0 0 "
0

0

0

True, the appellee here did not make application
for its permit as a consequence of an injunction or a
threatened seizure. A sort of coercion, however, attended the obtaining of it, for appellee was required
by the statu.te to be licensed (if it operated) on pain
of receiving criminal penalties and of the closure of
its business. • o o
To hold applicable the doctrine of estoppel in a
case of this kind would be to place the liquor dealer
in a two-homed dilemma, from the choosing of either
hom of which detriment might result to him. Thus, if
he refuses to apply for the license, maintaining that
certain statutory conditions surrounding its issuance
violate his constihitional rights, he may be severely
penalized; if, on the other hand, he secures the permit
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he is denied the right of attacking the constitutionality
of the statutory conditions.
But the law does not prevent such an attack. The
United States Supreme Court has said specifically that
the acceptance of a required statutory license does not
impose an the licensee an obligation to respect or to
comply with any provisions of the statute that are
repugnant to the constitution. Cargill Company v.
State of Mtnnesota ex rel. Railroad & Warehouse
Commission, 180 U.S. 452, 21 S Ct 423,45 L. Ed 619.
And the soundness of this view cannot be denied. The
immunization of a law from constitutional attack by
the simple expedient of requiring licenses from those
in a business sought to be regulated clearly would be
inharmonious with our American system of checks and
balances. (Emphasis added. )
In 1921, the Utah Supreme Court recognized this same
principle in Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission, 58
Utah 314, 199 Pac. 152, 153:
The fundamental distinction between these cases and
the case at bar consists in the fact that the plaintiff
in the instant case cannot be said to have accepted
that provision of the law which it now asserts is unconstitutional. Neither has it received any benefit
therefrom; hence it is difficult to see wherein the doctrine of estoppel can apply. In fact, it cannot be contended that plaintiff has voluntarily accepted any
provision of the Industrial Act, for the act has been
held to be compulsory.
The quotation from Fahey vs. Mallonee, 332 US 245,91
L. ed. 2031, is quoted in full at the beginning of the annota·
tion at 65 ALR 2d 660 referred to above. It should be noted
that the quotation is contained in the dissenting opinion of
Justice Brandeis, who concurred in the result on this one
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point, and said quotation is pure dictum. Ashwander vs.
TV~\, 297 US 288, 348, 80 L ed 688, 711 contains the material
quoted, but at page 698 of 80 L Ed, the majority opinion
states:
The Government urges that the Power Company is
estopped to question the validity of the Act creating
the Tennessee Valley Authority and hence the stockholders, suing in the right of the corporation, cannot
maintain this suit. (Citing cases. ) We think that the
principle is not applicable here. (Emphasis furnished.)

Salt Lake City Lines vs. Salt Lake City, 6 Ut 2d 428,
315 Pac 2d 859, is readily distinguished from the instant case.
The case involved a revenue tax based on gross revenues
contained in a Salt Lake City ordinance. The tax challenged
by Salt Lake City Lines had clearly been a condition precedent to the issuance of the franchise inasmuch as the same
ordinance approving the transfer to the plaintiff contained
the license tax on intracity passenger transportation. The
bus company was properly estopped.
All of the other cases are distinguishable on grounds
already set forth herein. One of these, Gregory vs. H ecke,
73 Cal App 268, 238 Pac 787, has been distinguished by a
later California Appellate Court in People vs. Western Fruit
Growers, 129 Pac 2d 53, where, at page 54, it concluded its
opinion as follows:
Plaintiff and the cross-defendants contend, further, that defendant here is estopped to dispute the
validity of the license, relying upon the staetment in
Gregory v. Heeke, 1925, 73 Cal App 268, 284, 238 P
787, 794, that "One who elects to accept the benefits
of a statute fs estopped from denying its validity."
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0

0

0

It appears that over a considerable period of
time, before this action was begun, defendant applied
for and received such quotas and it is these acts
which, its adversaries claim, estop it from objecting
to the validity of the license. But in so acting defendant was confronted with section 7 of the 1935 act
which made is a misdemeanor, punishable by a minimum fine of $50 or a minimum imprisonment of 10
days, or by both, to violate any provision of a state
license, and declared, "Each day any of the violations
above referred to shall continue shall constitute a separate offense." The same penalty provision appeared
in the 1937 act, Section 14. Under the statutory
scheme defendant became subject to the license and
therefore liable for its violation, upon its promulgation, without any affirmative act on its part. Compliance with the license in the face of such penalties and
under such circumstances does not work an estoppel
to dispute its validity. (Emphasis added. )
Section 54-6-18 Utah Code Annotated 1953 specifies that
every violation of the Motor Carirer Act is a misdemeanor,
and Section 54-7-25 stipulates that every violation of Title
54 "or of any order, decision, decree, rule, demand, or requirement, or any part or provision thereof, of the Commission ° 0 0 is a separate and distinct defense and, in case of
a continuing violation, each day's continuance thereof shall
be a separate and distinct offense."
Respondent is not estopped to challenge the constitutionality of the Utah Motor Carriers Act. On the contrary,
only someone in its position has sufficient standing to complain, as indicated in the next Point.
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POINT III
RESPONDENT HAS THE REQUISITE JUSTICIABLE INTEREST TO CHALLENGE THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MOTOR CARRIER ACT AND BELONGS TO THE CLASS
ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THE DISCRIMINATORY EXCEPTIONS THERETO.
Appellants have correctly stated broad general principles, but Respondent submits same have not been correctly applied to the facts of this case.
In the first place, their entire argument is inapplicable,
for the reason that Respondent is patently harmed by the
tmreasonable discriminations created by the exceptions from
general regulation of motor carrier transportation, for hire,
under the Motor Carrier Act. It should also be remembered
that Respondent contends that the entire Motor Carrier Act
is unconstitutional. How can anyone claim that a regulated
motor carrier is not adversely affected? A more complete discussion of the differences between a regulated and an exempt
motor carrier has been detailed under Point I of this brief.
The discrimination extends further than merely to the freedom to haul certain commodities without the necessity of
proving public convenience and necessity at a contested
public hearing. It also includes the right to conduct business without constant bureaucratic regulation. (See sample
list on page 7 of this brief of the differences between the
two types of motor carriers. )
Appellants also contend that Respondent does not have
sufficient interest to bring this suit. The principle involved
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here is stated at 11 American Jurisprudence 755, "Constitutional Law," Section 111:
The general rule that in order to attack the constitutionality of a statute a person must show sufficient
interest in himself applies with full force to attempted
attacks upon the constitutionality of acts of the de·
partments of government. It is an established principle that for a private individual to be entitled to
invoke t'ne judicial power to determine the validity of
executive or legislative action, he must show that he
has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct mjury as a result of that action; it is not
sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.
The statement on page 4 of Appellants' Brief that the
Appellant Commission has assessed a penalty against Respondent in the amount of $18,500.00 "for violations of the
Motor Carrier Act," in and of itself is sufficient evidence that
Respondent is in danger of sustaining injury under the Act.
Appellants in their answer also admitted that they have
caused criminal citations to be issued against Respondent
and Respondent's employees for alleged failure to comply
with the Motor Carrier Act. (R.3 Par. 7; R. 17, Par. 2).
An analysis of the cases relied upon by Appellants indi·
cates the substantial diff~rence on the facts between such
cited cases and the case at bar:

Tileston v. Ullman, 318 US 44, involved a physician who
attacked a statute which made unlawful the giving of advice
in the use of contraceptives. The court correctly held that
he had insufficient standing to raise this question, and that
only the patients could challenge the statute.

In Jeffrey Manufacturing Co. vs. Blagg, 235 US 571, it
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was held that the employer, who attempted to attack a
Workmen's Compensation statute that applied only to employers with more than five employees, did not have sufficient standing to raise the question of an unconstitutional
discrimination. The decision is clearly correct that only an
excluded employee could raise this question.

State v. Hcitz, ...... Idaho ...... , 238 Pac 2d 439, involved
a criminal proceeding where the defendant was convicted of
driving an overweight truck. Defendant challenged the
constitutionality, not only of the provision under which he
was convicted, but of other provisions of the penal code. The
Court properly concluded that he did not have standing to
attack the constitutionality of any section except the one
under which he was being prosecuted.
Bode, ct al v. Barrett, et al, 344 US 583, 97 L. ed. 567,
involved the constitutionality of a gross weight tax statute.
The Court held the plaintiff could not complain of nine provisions of the Act not directly affecting plaintiff.
None of authorites cited by Appellants is applicable to
this case. Respondent clearly has standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the Motor Carrier Act.

POINT IV
THE EXEMPriONS OF THE MOTOR CARRIER ACT RENDER THE ENTIRE ACT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The judgment of the trial court in declaring invalid all
of Chapter 6, Title 54, UCA 1953, should be sustained for
at least one of two reasons:
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1. The legislature would not have enacted the statute
without the exclusion of the enumerated classes.
2. The Motor Carrier Act has no severability clause inasmuch as it was repealed with the adoption of the 1953
Utah Code Annotated, but such a clause would not save
this legislation.
The cases cited at 11 American Jurisprudence 855 are
too numerous to be cited here. The proposition, however,
bears repeating:
One important class of cases in which questions as to
the severability of valid and invalid portions of an act
and the determination of the legislative intent are involved consists of statutes containing invalid exceptions or provisis. The general rule is that if such proviso operates to limit the scope of the act in such a
manner that by striking out the proviso, the remainder
of the statute would have a broader scope either as
to subject or territory, then the whole act is invalid,
because such extended operation would not be in accordance with the legislative intent. (See Frost v.
Corporation Commission 278 US 515, 73 L Ed 483
and other cases cited at 11 Am. Jur. 855) (Emphasis
mine.)
Continuing at 11 American Jurisprudence 856:
In all such cases the exception of a particular group
from the provisions of a general statute may ha~e
been a material consideration with the legislature m
the passage of the act, and the courts may p~operly
infer that it would not have been enacted if such
group had not been excluded from its operation and
protected from its provision.
Although the Utah Motor Act, when adopted in 1935 as
Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935, contained a severability
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clause (Section 25 ), as quoted on page 40 of Appellant's
Brid, this clause has hccn repealed and is no longer law.
AmendatorY ads have also contained severability clauses,
but obviou~ly these applied only to the particular acts then
before the legislature. Section 68-1-9 UCA 1953 reads as
follows:
The statute books consisting of ten volumes known as
Utah Code Annotated 1953, duly certified by the
Governor 0 0 o is approved, adopted and legalized
as to arrangement of said compilation by Title, Chapter, Article and Section for the purpose of amendment
or repeal of, or additions to any statute compiled
therein in whole or in part by reference thereto.
Respondent feels that Appellants are reading things into
Justin• v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 12 Utah 2d 357, 366 P. 2d
974. which the case does not stand for.
Nowhere can Respondent see where the court was asked to
determine whether the exclusion of more than "banks and
mercantile houses" was unconstitutional The opinion obsern's that the question presented is whether their exclusion
makes the act arbitrary, discriminatory class legislation.
Contrary to the argument of Appellants, the argument could
also be made that there is no specific showing of evidence as
to the evidence of banks and mercantile houses that the
legislature is arbitrary in excluding them from the operation
of the statute. Without knowing, this writer is of the opinion
that the matter of banks and mercantile houses may have
been the only objection urged upon the court, and that no
more can or should be written into the decision.
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CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the trial court's judgment contains
no error and should be affirmed.

WAYNE C. DURHAM

Att()Tney f()T Respondent
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